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,f Corporate Responsibility1 as a Problem of 
Company Constitution*
I
In the Federal Republic of Germany the theme of 
co-determination has dominated debate on company 
constitutions to such an extent that approaches and 
potential solutions under both heads almost blend into 
each other. This has apparent advantages. The academic 
debate on models of company constitution has clearly 
gained in realism, dynamism and depth ( 1 ) from the 
successful institutionalization of co-determination, 
viewed internationally as German corporate law's most 
important contribution (2). At the same time, the risks 
of such a blending of concepts are becoming apparent. 
If company constitution becomes totally embedded in the 
conceptual approach of co-determination, then important 
dimensions of the problem risk being submerged. Typical 
of this is the "Report of the Company Law Commission", 
in which structural problems of economic organization 
are reduced to interests of interested interest groups
(3). As against this background, it would seem 
important - and this is the thesis of the considerations 
set out below - to free the law of company constitutions




























































































systematically orient it towards the concept of social 
responsibility of economic enterprises» With this in 
view it seems useful to compare the debate on "corporate 
responsibility" , carried on mainly in the USA, with the 
German discussion on company constitutions. Such a 
confrontation can be expected to yield mutual 
enrichment. While interesting results of the debate on 
"corporate responsibility" can be found (4), their 
relation to organizational structures remains largely 
unclarified. On the other hand, the shortcoming of the 
company constitution debate lies in its leaving in the 
dark the importance of the central concept of the firm's 
relationship to society, though it does call for this. 
Whether "corporate responsibility" can throw any light 
on this darkness must be investigated, and the question 
of its implications for company constitution should be 
posed.
Why is the co-determination perspective too narrow? It 
is at any rate too narrow when it is underpinned by a 
concept of economic democracy that aims primarily at the 
individual participation of those concerned. But this 
treatment of the co-determination idea in terms of the 
individual is widespread (5). In a number of variants 
co-determination is interpreted as compensation for 
social domination. Individual participation by workers 




























































































mechanisms - is supposed to promote the worker's human 
dignity, humanize the world of work, control managerial 
domination and also extend the realization of the 
democratic principle of participation in decision-making 
to «corporate enterprises. Indubitably individual 
democratic participation and humanization of the world 
of work constitute social policy goals of the highest 
rank. But there can certainly be no doubt as to whether 
the function of institutionalized co-determination has 
really been grasped thereby. This is even more true for 
the concept of company contitutions. It is just not 
enough to confine oneself here to the internal 
perspective of the firm and its members. This 
perspective entirely overlooks the social function of 
the corporate organization, which should be the first 
thing a legal corporate constitution should concern 
itself with. Putting it quite bluntly, a corporate 
enterprise is not an institution of self-service and 
self-realization for either shareholders or workers, but 
has a social task to fulfill.
One cannot break out of this over-narrow perspective 
even by being more ambitious and basing co-determination 
and company constitutions on the theory of the social 
association and its further developments in organization 
theory (6). To be sure, objections to cross-fertilizing 




























































































organizations or business administration cannot be based 
on the assumption that normative conclusions might be 
drawn from presumably empirical observations - a 
criticism repeatedly made (7). On this point the 
representatives of the organization sociology approach 
are much more reflective, even if they sometimes express 
themselves incomprehensibly, than their legal critics 
are prepared to accept (8). On the contrary they have 
the specific merit of having drawn attention to a 
normative problem not brought out sufficiently by the 
classical ownership model: the mediation of social 
demands on economic action through organization. But 
the real problem with organization sociology lies 
elsewhere, namely in its lack of relationship to society 
at large (9). The limitation to internal aspects of 
organization sociology excludes to develop 
society-oriented criteria for the distribution of 
internal property rights. It is true, that to a certain 
degree organization sociology < does reflect the 
organization's relationship to the environment, via the 
concept of organizational goal (10). But since this 
still symbolizes only the internal view of the 
environment it ultimately cannot lead beyond the 
internal perspective. It is the historic merit of the 
followers of organization theory to have consciously 
questionned the legitimacy of the company law membership 
concept. But their contribution has been limited in 




























































































organizations' s relationship to society. Hence the legal 
discussion should not give up grapping with organization 
theory, but instead intensify its activity while 
simultaneously seeking the analytical means for 
developing systematically the societal relation of firms 
( 1 1 ).
Another inadequate analogy drawn from the 
co-determination discussion is that whereby membership 
in a firm is oriented towards the resources contributed. 
The resource approach is presented in two versions, one 
analytical and one normative. In the analytical 
version, it is only membership in the firm that is 
defined, according to which actors, in contrast to mere 
partners to an exchange, have "pooled" resources in the 
firm (providers of capital, managers, employees). 
Questions that then appear matters of company 
constitution are arrangements for aspects of command and 
of distribution, dealing with the members as resource 
contributors (12). It is obviously that this approach 
is even conceptually confined to the internal 
perspective. The only thing that appears as a social 
function of the firm is the placing in common of 
individual resources and the problems that result. 
Functions for the company constitution that relate to 





























































































The second, normative version relates resource 
contribution not merely to membership but largely also 
to the possession of control rights in the firm (13). 
How control rights are distributed within the 
organization is to be determined by what groups of 
people have contributed resources to the enterprise. 
The classical model is, of course, private property: he 
who pays, acquires. This justification pattern has 
however since been taken up by the trade union movement 
and transferred to the resource of labour: labour 
creates, if not ownership, then at least 
co-determination. The equal rights of capital and 
labour in the distribution of control rights in the firm 
are supposed to be justified on the basis that the 
factors of labour and capital make equivalent 
contributions to the firm's success. On this argument, 
of course, the factor of "disposition" can also secure 
its legitimate share in control rights.
The connection between resource and control rights is 
thereby generalized by comparison with the ideas of 
property law (ownership of things, capital). But its 
legitimation nevertheless remains questionable. Just as 
it is hard to see "why control functions in the economic 
process should be heritable within families and be bound 
up with the accumulation of fast cars and beautiful 




























































































to see why the contribution of labour (which is after 
all paid) should legitimate the exercise of control 
rights of importance to society as a whole. What 
justifies the making of production decisions dependent 
on the needs only of the resource contributors - capital 
owners, workers, managers? The link between resource 
and control, so successfully critized by the 
co-determination movement, and weakened as it already 
was by the familiar trend to separate ownership from 
control, is in a new way reestablished by that movement 
itself. The discussion on company constitutions should 
now absolutely free itself from this bracketing 
together. From the viewpoint of legal policy, it is 
precisely the opposite that seems necessary: The 
de-coupling of resource ownership and privileged control 
rights (15). The distribution of control rights within 
the firm should be oriented primarily towards the social 
functions of the firms, and not to which resources are 
contributed by which groups of people. More abstractly, 
"distribution and production planning must be made 
variable against each other independently of specific 
interest linkages and thereby rationalized" (16). What 
is worth retaining from one control model of private 
ownership is, certainly , the machinery it contains for 
rewarding success. With a de-coupling of resource 
ownership from control rights, functional equivalents 
for the historically rather successful unification of 




























































































It is precisely when one abandons the idea that control 
rights in the firm must unconditionally be a consequence 
of "corporate property" that one will be compelled to 
learn a lesson from private ownership, that of the 
effective linkage of decision-making powers with the 
bearing of the consequences, as an incentive and control 
principle (17).
While, then, the debate on the company constitution
ought to free itself of many elements of the
co-determination debate as it mostly treats control 
problems onesidedly on the internal or resource 
perspective, the latter does nevertheless provide a 
variety of starting points. This is true particularly 
of the so-called pluralist approach as a legitimation of 
co-determination (18). This deduces company 
constitution structures from the requirements placed by 
differing social interests and interest groups on the 
economic enterprise. In the pluralist approach the 
internal perspective has already been left behind: What 
interests in society (and not only in the organization) 
should legitimately affect the structure of the 
organization? The link between resources and control is 
broken: It is not the contribution of a resource that 
decides on co-determination rights, but society’s 
interest in the firm's success. To be sure , this 




























































































pluralist theories. It stresses the multiplicity of 
social interests, without offering theoretically based 
criteria for normatively distinct interests (18a). It 
therefore runs the risk of abandoning the shaping of the 
company constitution to the mercy of the constantly 
changing resultant of the power constellations between 
social interest groups. This is a temptation that a 
legal discussion aware of its jurisprudential task, 
should not yield to: that of providing legal 
foundations for the power claims of interest groups in 
terms of political or constitutional arguments. A 
pluralist approach thus frees company law from onesided 
interest ties, but at the same time creates new problems 
of orientation. Clearly the pluralist approach needs 
leadership from a theory that poses the legitimate 
social function of the firm at the centre and which 
thereby chooses legitimate social interests in the 
control of the firm from among the multiplicity of 
interests (19). The question then arises, whether the 
theory of "corporate responsibility" is capable of this. 
There are important questions to ask of this theoretical 
tradition, presented here through two representative 
authors. What contribution does the concept of social 
responsibility make to clarifying the legitimate goals 
of a universal company constitution? What legal 
instruments are capable of enhancing the social 





























































































"The social responsibility of firms" is central to the 
analysis of the Swiss economist Peter Ulrich, who has 
developed a critique of the concept into a theory of the 
big corporation as a semi-public institution. 
Consistently, Ulrich orients his investigation from the 
outward social function of the corporation, thereby 
freeing himself simultaneously from the perspective 
criticized above, of internal democratization, from the 
theory of the social association, from the resource 
approach and from the view oriented only towards group 
interests . This becomes clear even in the expansive 
exposition of his theoretical premises, which compels 
him to cut a swather through the "grand theories" of 
political science i.e. concepts of democracy, crisis 
and control (19a). But especially in the last part of 
his work which is what primarily concerns us here, he 
develops, from a societally oriented standpoint, an 
original conception of the quasi-public corporation, 
giving suggestions for its legal realisation (20).
Even in the introductory description of the liberal idea 
of legitimation of the firm, by contrast with individual 
centred interpretation it is the social relevance of the 



























































































justification of classical liberal single-interest 
corporate structures lies according to this not only in 
the link with the intentions of the capital owners, but 
primarily in the functional orientation towards welfare 
of the people and the general interest (Adam Smith). 
The classical "democratic legitimation" through 
corporate constitution and private ownership finds real 
support only through the "functional legitimation", 
namely the relationship to functions of allocation and 
growth. Accordingly Ulrich does not simply confine 
criticism of the liberal model to the constitutional 
reality of the corporation, which he characterizes by 
the personal subdivisions of the identity in the model 
between risk, control and profit. Instead, he stresses, 
as against this "internal deficit of democracy" the 
importance of the "functional deficit of legitimation". 
The foreground of his criticism of the liberal model of 
the firm is therefore occupied not by aspects internal 
to the organization but by the whole "constitutional 
reality of the economic system." The current problems 
of the latter are sketched out by Ulrich in four 
dimensions: producer sovereignty, politicization of the 
private firm, deficits in the allocation and 
distribution performance of the economic system (22).
Hence the classical model and present day reality, in



























































































counterposed. Thus, course for further discussion has 
been set. Normative proposals for the company 
constitution would then have to be developed by 
overcoming this discrepancy. They cannot content 
themselves with calling for internal democracy within 
the organization for the members, nor for a strengthened 
legal protection for interest groups, whether internal 
or external. The company constitution should instead be 
oriented much more towards "societal criteria": 
"allocation function in the national economy, employment 
function, yield and income function for workers, capital 
providers and state, ecological effects, socio-cultural 
effects on those working in the firm and on the 
environment etc." (23).
Ulrich's specific company constitution proposals are 
clearly oriented towards this external perspective of 
the firm. He sees the function of a pluralist company 
constitution as being that it "institutionally 
internalizes in management's mandate interests, 
motivations and goals previously seen as external 
interests" (25). He pleads for a four-bench-system 
(capital, management, workers, public) which should be 
set up directly within the management organ (board 
system) and not merely in a body for representation of 
interest and of supervision (supervisory board system) 




























































































in the representation of the so-called public. 
According to Ulrich, special commisssions formed jointly 
by economic, social environmental and consumer 
protection agencies, should send public representatives 
to the board. They would have two functions: (1 ) 
internalization of societal effects in the 
decision-making criteria of the board, (2) function as 
linkpins between governmental economic policy agencies 
and the individual firm. The trade union presence is 
likewise justified essentially by external functions, 
namely by the coordination between divergent employee 
interests (27). Correspondingly, ideas of individual 
democratic participation appear only secondarily - as 
"complementary concepts of basic democracy", with which 
a company constitution must be compatible, but which do 
not represent the primary function (28).
Up to this point Ulrich is remarkable for the 
consistency with which he conceives the company 
constitution on the basis of its social function. 
Thereafter, however, the chain of thought breaks off 
rather abruptly. After Ulrich has worked out the 
outlines of a societally related, pluralist company 
constitution, he suddenly turns to various mechanisms of 
governmental economic control, which should have the 
actual task of securing the social function (29). 




























































































functions of which he sees in coordination, the setting 
of priorities, the internalization of social decisions 
and control over the activities of firms (30). For this 
purpose, indirect means of macro-political control of 
investment (guidance taxes), and direct means of 
micro-political investment control (orders, 
prohibitions, permit procedures) should be introduced 
(31 ). The company constitution as such then appears 
only as more or less a means to an end. Its internal 
pluralist structure is only a condition for the 
effectiveness of a societally related external political 
control ( 32 ).
The point to criticize here is not the attempt to secure 
the mutual alignment of the organizational constitution 
of firms and the economic policy of the state. Any 
well-considered conception of economic constitution 
would have to do so. But there must be objection to - 
or better regret at - the premature termination of the 
intellectual effort at orienting precisely the internal 
order of the firm towards the social task of the 
enterprise. The implicit undervaluation of the 
overtures made towards a societally related company 
constitution results almost inevitably in an 
overvaluation of state economic control. This leads 
Ulrich's thinking back along to traditional lines, not 




























































































"knotty problem of selecting criteria for the necessity 
of intervention and the direction of guidance" as the 
crux of state economic control, he offers only a faute 
de mieux solution, a "cautious, learning-oriented 
political procedure" by the external political control 
bodies (33 ).
Ulrich's intellectual approach should therefore be 
retained at the expense of his implementation. For the 
approach in fact offers the possibility of avoiding the 
overstrain that becomes very clear in Ulrich on 
governmental control capacities, with tasks of economic
guidance definition of the political function of
enterprises, and specific and detailed regulation of
obligations by pulling back the governmental control 
into more abstract, indirect forms of influence. 
Ulrich's approach would have to be thought out further 
in this direction: the company constitution as the 
constitution of an autonomous , learning-capable social 
system, the general structures, but not the practical 
results of which are societally defined.
Following up the question of the cause of this 
discrepancy between approach and implementation , one 
very quickly comes upon the concept of the "social 




























































































detail the debate on "corporate responsibility", but in 
such a way as to leave unexploited the chances of 
actually integrating social responsibility and company 
constitution with each other. He sketches out the 
arguments that have been developed in the various 
dsciplines in favour of the concept of corporate 
responsibility. Economically, the aim is long-term 
stabilization of the firm as against short-term 
profitability, and simultaneously the securing of social 
framework conditions for economic activities. 
Politically, the point is the firm's reaction to the 
rising pressure of interest groups to secure such a 
minimum level of social responsibility, which ultimately 
is the only thing that enables and ensures the autonomy 
of economic decisions. Legally ,the aim is to 
concretize general-clause conceptions of social 
responsibility into operational obligations and 
implementing machinery. Nevertheless, in Ulrich the 
whole thing comes down to a remarkably narrow version of 
the concept of corporate responsibility. It appears as 
a "morally motivated freewill responsibility of 
businessmen and managers" (35). Ulrich is thereby 
formulating the problem as if the growing politicization 
of economic enterprises, and hence the increase in their 
power of decision and of influence, can be compensated 
through an increased moralization of economic activity. 
Corporate responsibility would then mean that undesired 




























































































prevented by individual moral endeavour on the part of 
those responsible.
Criticising such a concept is hardly difficult. The 
impotence of morality as a control mechanism in the face 
of imperatives of economic rationality is no new insight 
(36). Ulrich finds it then relatively simple to show 
the peculiarly unrealistic, ideological aspects of a 
morally charged corporate responsibility (37). The wish 
to build upon individual decisions through the 
consciousness of managers acting in a statesmanlike 
manner to control societal structural effects is rightly 
criticized by him as economically inefficient, 
politically elitist and legally uncontrollable. But 
with this morally-based conceptual scheme Ulrich has 
manoeuvred the issue into a rather unfruitful situation 
of decision between morals or law. Thus, if the 
question is: "Should the undesired social effects of 
private economic activity be internalized in economic 
decisions through morally motivated voluntary 
responsibility on the part of businessmen and managers, 
or through legal responsibilities?" (38), then the 
answer can obviously only be through the law. It then 
also seems plausible that the fulfillment of the social 
tasks of the firm can primarily be ensured only by 
governmental measures. Then, however, the three 




























































































company constitution, economie control by government and 
social responsibility - can no longer be truly 
integrated, but only put - as Ulrich does - additively 
in a tripartite concept (39). While governmental 
economic control is to provide the primary definition of 
functions, pluralist company constitution and legally 
regulated responsibility act only secondarily, as 
support mechanisms. Corporate responsibility then 
appears subordinately as a professional attitude of the 
managers (professional ethics) (40).
The alternative to this ill conceived choice between 
morals and law would however be to ask the following
question: Is it possible to enhance the potential of
decentralized self-control by legal structural
provisions? Can one conceive of external control via
internal self-regulation that would relieve governmental
control of the burden of substantive regulation and
internalize social responsibilities into the
decision-making structures of economic enterprises (41 )? 
Here one does not need to make a choice between morals 
and law, but instead to utilize the law to compel firms 
to take account of the social consequences of their 
actions. Such a formulation of the problem would in 
fact lead to confronting functional problems of social 
responsibility primarily with structural solutions, 




























































































Under the provocative title "Where the law ends", 
Christopher Stone has directed a study towards precisely 
these questions (42). Where the law ends, namely with 
legal bureaucratic control of economic activity on 
behalf of society, is where the realm of corporate 
responsibility should begin. But this is no longer to 
be understood as voluntary submission to a morality of 
enterprise, but on the contrary as a legally grounded 
social obligation to limit certain economic 
possibilities in the interest of society. Accordingly, 
the title might equally well have read "Where the law 
begins", namely with the hard task of social control of 
self-regulation within organizations.
III
In parallel with Ulrich, Stone takes the first step in 
his thinking with the theory of market-failures (43). 
He sketches out the essential arguments concerning the 
limits of the market's control capacities. But right 
from the next step in the argument, the difference 
becomes clear. While Ulrich recommends, as compensatory 
measures, political control of the economy and external 
legal regulation of company responsibility, which are 
only to be ensured by an internal pluralist company 




























































































"law-failure": "Why the Law Can't Do It" (44). In this 
Stone systematically pursues the structural deficits of 
interventionist legal control of economic activity : 
the unavoidable time lag of the law, which allows only 
reaction after the fact, the selectivity of the 
legislative process, information deficits, consensus 
difficulties, the difficulties of legal purposive 
programs, the limits of negative sanctions by comparison 
with positive means of motivation, and the 
implementation difficulties of the "regulatory 
agencies". Both, the "market-failures" and the 
"law-failures" taken together lead Stone to a concept of 
corporate responsibility clearly distinct on the one 
hand from the philosophy of managerialism and on the 
other from the sheer internal implementation of external 
laws (45). He relies not on moral appeals but instead 
on the compulsion of the state law. Nor should law be 
used for directly regulating economic activity, 
according to the model of the regulatory agencies, but 
instead for indirectly controlling internal organization 
structures through external regulation. The function of 
the law is then not as for Ulrich the external control 
of the firm's conduct, but external mobilization of 
internal self-control resources. For this, to be sure, 
a new approach is needed : "The society shall have to 
locate certain specific and critical organizational 
variables, and where feasible, reach into the 




























































































appropriate" (46). By contrast with the result-oriented 
interventions of the regulatory agencies, there is here 
only process-oriented control: the legal system now 
concentrates on the regulation of essential 
decision-making processes of the firm itself.
What legal instruments does Stone propose to create the 
structural conditions for a "corporate conscience?" He 
suggests a concept of company constitution in the 
broadest sense, which is now, however, oriented 
primarily towards the goal of social responsibility 
(47). Stone puts forward a number of company 
constitution proposals, going from the distribution of 
control rights on the board and among management, via 
the reestablishment of powers for so-called public 
directorships to the changing of information channels in 
the firm and the reorganization of decision-making 
processes.
He begins with relatively modest proposals for reforming 
the board of directors. They are aimed at enhancing its 
sensitivity to social consequences by measures aimed at 
insuring that relevant information reaches the 
appropriate point of decision (48). As well as 
questions of the composition of the control body (inside 




























































































directors, this includes the proposal for a compulsory 
exhaustive and clear description of the directors' 
functions ("formal job description"), along with 
liability arrangements precisely related to it. Further 
aspects are the finishing of a bureaucratic staff for 
the control body and the guaranteeing of an adequate 
flow of information to the board.
While measures of this kind are certainly capable of 
enhancing the board's control activity, particularly by 
the combination of job description and liability 
arrangements, they nevertheless do not reach the really 
sore point of a direct conflict between organization and 
society. Here Stone comes up with proposals for much 
more throughgoing reform. He recommends the legal 
institutionalization of new types of control and 
decision-making power: general public directorships and 
special public directorships (49).
For firms above a particular size, a definite percentage 
of seats on the board should be occupied by public 
directors. This percentage should, moreover, rise with 
increasing size of firm. They should be appointed by an 
independent commission ( the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or a Federal Corporations Commission, to be 




























































































guarantee that they can exercise the following 
functions: (1) "Super-Ego-Function": reflecting the 
social consequences of economic activity, (2) "Legal 
Audits": the supervision of programme that control the 
implementation of state laws within the firm , ( 3) Link 
with legislation: proposals for laws and for economic 
standards, (4) Efficiency control over important 
internal systems, (5) "Hot-line-function": collecting 
station for critical information from the corporate 
area, (6) "Impact Studies": the gathering of 
information on the effects on society of the corporate 
product, (7) Information flow between firm and 
environment, (8) Verifying the representation structure 
of the firm's management, (9) Identification with the 
long term interests of the firm.
The problems with such a proposal to embrace the 
complex, multi-dimensional "public interest" in an 
economic enterprise "administered" by one single 
bureaucratic organ within the organization, even one 
with very great power and information, are seen by Stone 
himself (50). He seeks to deal with them through a 
well-tried organizational ploy - internal 
differentiation and specialization. For those social 
areas where economic activity creates chronic problems - 
such as technological innovation, product security, 




























































































independent experts should be employed as "special 
public directors" . This should in any case be done 
when two critical situations arise. Firstly, in the 
case of repeated infractions of the law, if there are 
indications that internal organizational structures 
systematically produce legal irregularities that 
evidently cannot be removed by external sanctions. 
Secondly, in the case of typical industrial problems 
(e.g. health risks in the asbestos industry) that call 
for constant expert supervision. As in European 
experiments with the role of the worker director or of a 
data protection expert (51), Stone stresses the dual 
function of such a position within the organization. He 
relies on a "stroke of genius of modern social systems", 
namely the deliberate use of intra-role-conflicts by 
means of the law (52). Protection of external interests 
is to be combined with internal power and information. 
Stone seeks to solve the problems arising with this 
the limits of the role conflict and resistance within 
the firm - essentially by providing the special public 
director with a maximum of information and power thus 
placing him as high as possible in the corporate 
hierarchy.
Follow up proposals of Stone are aimed at influencing 
corporate structures even below the top management level 




























































































On the basis of his ideas, it should be possible, 
through legislation, court decision or administrative 
act of regulatory agencies, to make obligatory, at 
various levels of the hierarchy of the firm's 
organization, either the setting-up of different 
programmes of action or the creation of internal control 
powers for particular social problems. These would have 
to be combined with clear assignments of functions and 
effective liability sanctions. Stone is building here 
on various experiments in American law where - mostly in 
connection with court settlements - economic enterprises 
had to set up internal decision-making and control 
procedures, or accept the sending-in of a supervisory 
expert. Further proposals aim at the compulsory 
creation of internal information systems (54). Here 
Stone relies on the control efficiency of publicity 
which he would like to see put to service of a variety 
of social interests. Finally, Stone goes on to develop 
ideas on the external restructuring of decision-making 
processes internal to the firm (55). These concern the 
choice of hierarchy levels at which particular critical 
decisions have to be taken compulsorily, or would 
require a qualitative majority within a collective body 
for certain decisions, and further the need to involve 
outside interests (workers, local councils, interests 
groups) in particular decisions, and finally particular 
reporting duties on the firm in relation to severe 






























































































What can be gained from all this for the debate on 
company constitutions? How can the concept of corporate 
responsibility, selectively presented here on the basis 
of two approaches, contribute to throwing light on the 
goals of company constitutions and to developing legal 
regulations for them? As we saw, the strength of 
Ulrich's analysis was at the level of goals, while at 
the level of means he did not essentially go beyond 
existing proposals. Precisely the opposite is true of 
Stone. While his structural proposals to enhance 
corporate conscience are capable of considerably 
advancing discussion at the level of means, his ideas at 
the level of goals remain remarkably vague and 
indefinite. Are convergences possible here? And in 
what direction should both approaches then be rethought?
The legal imaginativeness which with Stone develops his 
structural proposals on a wide basis of material is 
impressive (56). If one abstracts a little from his 
specific proposals and pays attention to the 




























































































lead beyond the existing debate and how they have might 
stimulate legal policy thinking.
One of the directions is specification. While the 
German debate on company constitutions essentially 
concentrates on the representation of a general "public 
interest" on the boards (government representatives, 
co-opted public figures), Stone's proposals aim at 
specific machinery for solving specific problems. The 
proposals to concentrate the powers of one special 
public director on dealing with environment problems is 
only one example for the general approach : the 
identification of a particular social problem and the 
creation of a solution mechanism precisely designed for 
the purpose with specific powers, decision-making 
procedures and standards of liability.
A second direction is the inclusion of the whole
corporate structure . While the German debate
essentially turns on interest representation on the
supervisory board, Stone's ideas suggest that all
corporate bodies and hierarchy levels should be taken
into consideration, paying attention, not only to
participatory rights, but at the same time to





























































































The third and perhaps most important direction may be 
called the generalization of company law mechanisms. 
The point here is to examine the whole historically 
developed machinery of interest protection in company 
law to see whether it can be generalized in the 
direction of broader social requirements. Participation 
in decisions, responsibility standards, liability 
arrangements, control procedures, right to sue court 
procedures, should be rethought to see whether and to 
what extent they can be made use of to promote the 
social responsibility of economic enterprise. To be 
sure, one has to be aware of cummulative effects caused 
by this strategy of generalization. A comprehensive 
utilization of control mechanisms would not make sense, 
rather, a strategical move to neuralgic areas of 
"organization-failures".
It is from the aspect of generalization that admittedly 
the most critical issue is raised: generalization in 
relation to which social demands? Here lie the unsolved 
theoretical problems that we already identified as the 
central problem of all pluralist approaches. In good 
American tradition Stone sidesteps the problems very 
ably, through pragmatism. He works with specific 
historical experiences and can base himself on 
individual cases of problem areas where there is 




























































































solutions for them: environment protection, safety 
standards, product quality, white collar criminality. 
But is this enough?
In this connection, again, Ulrich's approach seems to 
lead further. He begins right where Christopher Stone 
ends, namely with the demand to develop "societal 
criteria". Even if Ulrich is overready to have recourse 
to state coordination and economic control, the 
consistent societal basis of his concept of company 
constitution should nevertheless be taken up and further 
thought out. The only question is how?
The suggestion will be made here, to try in future to 
use systems theory (58). If it is true that Ulrich has 
very promisingly analyzed the external functional 
orientation of the company constitution, but left his 
statements on internal structure in an unsatisfactory 
state, and if it is also true that by contrast Stone 
develops interesting structural proposals but remains 
vague and indefinite in functional statements, then 
systems theory has a chance. For its strength consists 
precisely in analyzing the internal structures of 
systems (here economic enterprises) in relation to their 
external environment performance and functions (59). 






























































































From a systems theory viewpoint an environment/system 
approach would seem consequent, if it converts the 
demands of the social environment into structures 
internal to the organization, notably also into company 
constitution law. A theory of the company constitution 
would then have to be placed in the context of the 
so-called contingency theory of the organization (60). 
The special feature of this theory is that it 
consequently leaves behind the internal perspective of 
the organization and instead sees the organization's 
internal structures, including company law, as dependent 
on the organization's environments. The term 
"contingency" (conditionality, dependency in particular 
situations, also uncertainty) is intended to indicate 
that there is no " best way to organize in all 
situations", but that it is only a differentiation of 
organizational structure according to the differing 
functions in the environment that can yield adequate 
solutions. The theory has considerably proved itself in 
empirical studies of industrial organizations (61). It 
appeared in two versions. The analytical version 




























































































discoverable connections between external functions and 
internal structures; the practice-oriented version 
arrived at normative statements on structural 
recommendations and innovations. This second version 
becomes interesting from the viewpoint of company 
constitution law if one stands aside from the viewpoint 
of the organization's management, in which works 
management theory, and goes over towards a societal 
perspective of the firm (62). Hence the point here is 
not to develop suitable strategies for environmentally 
appropriate internal differentiation and management 
styles, but to design general legal patterns that can 
provide the normative framework for environmentally 
adequate conduct on the part of economic enterprises.
To be sure, the question arises here too of theoretical 
guidance for the choice between different social 
approaches. (1) What demands should be selected as 
legitimate? (2) Which out of this narrower circle of 
legitimate social demands should then be transposed 
within organization and given legal form? From the 
legal standpoint Wiedemann gives a very remarkable 
systems oriented reduction of social structures to the 
demands of differing partial markets (62a). This can be 
used as a starting point. In a broader perspective, 
Krause has developed a consistent model of a market- and 




























































































consumer needs via market mechanisms into organizational 
goals and these in term via organizational mechanisms 
into individual economic acts (63). According to this, 
the function of the company constitution would be to 
sensitize the organization, through internal 
arrangements of corporate control rights , optimally to 
market-mediated consumer needs. The critical point of 
both approaches, however, lies in their normative 
restriction to the market and consumer perspective. Is 
the function of the economy adequately summed up by the 
satisfaction of material consumer needs ? Should social 
requirements on the economy, or on individual firms, not 
be formulated more widely? An easy way out might of 
course lie in differentiating between primary and 
secondary functions , whereby all non-market or 
non-consumer oriented demands might be assigned to the 
secondary level.
The dual orientation of the concept of the firm 
introduced by Th. Raiser might be of assistance here 
(64). On this, the "higher goal" of the firm can be 
defined either on its own viewpoint and from the 
perspective of the shareholders, managers, and 
employees, or on the viewpoint of the whole economy, 
namely of its contribution to increasing the social 
product and the national prosperity. It is alleged to 




























































































shaping the company constitution, places in the 
foreground the benefits for those taking part in the 
enterprise or for the consumers of its products. A 
legal concept of the firm ought to range these two goals 
side by side. It would then be left to economic policy 
decisions as to which aspect should ultimately be 
brought into the foreground.
Such a formulation of the legal concept of the firm has 
its advantage in avoiding the normative restrictions of 
a purely market or consumer orientation. State economic 
policy must then seek a "balance between private profit 
seeking and economic care and protection for the 
generality". The law of the company constitution ought 
then to be derived from a confrontation between 
competing economic policy conceptions. The appropriate 
neo-liberal or state intervention theories are already 
prepared to provide the combatants with legal 
ammunition. From . the experiences of the 
co-determination debate, it is easy to extrapolate how 
here too each side can accuse the other of ideology, or 
still worse of "ideological cleverness" or even more 
crudely of hostility towards the constitution, if these 
economic policy positions are legally instrumentalized.




























































































not already out of step with reality. The reality of 
the present-day constitution of firms and that of the 
economy - stands as it were, across the great economic 
policy controversy. The theoretical justification for 
this may lie in the fact that governmental economic 
policy - whether as rules of the game system or as 
constructive interventionism - is in principle not in a 
position to bring about a balance between private profit 
seeking and concern for the generality , but that this 
can be achieved only within the economic system itself, 
with the role of government economic policy and legal 
regulation remaining confined to indirect and abstract 
structural measures to stimulate such balancing within 
the economy ( it is to be hoped) effectively. By 
contrast with neo-liberal positions, government economic 
policy is not simply practicing the restoration of 
natural social order through the "visible hand" of the 
law. Instead it is aiming at "regulated autonomy", 
actively promoting self-regulating "learning" social 
systems and simultaneously endeavouring to reduce their 
deficits through compensatory corrections.
In support of this thesis we shall use here the 
distinction introduced by Luhmann between three system 
references - function, performance, reflection (65). 
Function concerns the relationship of the sub system to 




























































































system to other sub systems; reflection the 
relationship of the sub system to itself. The consumer 
oriented approach thinks, as it were, only in one system 
reference, that of the performance relationship, i.e. 
the relationship of the enterprise to the consumers. 
However, it lacks the transposition into structure of 
the function of the economy. If this is defined - again 
following Luhmann - as ensuring the satisfaction of 
social future needs, then the functional orientation of 
firms is not, as consumer-oriented conceptions put it, 
maximum satisfaction of consumer needs, but the 
diversion of as large as possible a yield from the 
production process for the guaranteeing of future need 
satisfaction, which in concrete terms is carried out by 
different forms of profit, taxes and wages (66).
This again does not mean that this orientation toward 
the societal function should be stressed onesidedly at 
the expense of the economic performance (satisfaction of
consumer needs). What is necessary is a process of
attunement of function and performance of the
enterprise. In this systems theory reformulation of the 
above-mentioned dual orientation of economic enterprise, 
it becomes at the same time clear why the "balance", the 
attunement between function and performance, cannot be 
produced from the outside through governmental economic 




























































































well-established thesis that from a particular degree of 
functional differentiation on, here the differentiation 
of the economic system as against politics and law, the 
separation between function and performance is so far 
advanced that they can be linked up only within 
subsystems as such (67). This is where theoretical 
justification can be found for the phenomena of "market 
failure" and "politics failure" in relation to the 
conduct of firms, which, as we saw above, caused 
Christopher Stone to attempt a reformulation of 
"corporate responsibility" . To create the "balance" 
through governmental economic policy would mean to make 
the worthless effort to attune the societal function and 
the performance relationships to social subsystems 
through control instruments external to the system. It 
is not prior structural policy decisions such as the 
familiar "basic decision " of neo-liberal doctrine or 
governmental planning decisions in an interventionist 
concept , that can solve the problems of mediation, but 
only - externally stimulated - reflexive action within 
the functional system itself (68). On this view, thus 
the social contingency of the company constitution is 
characterized by contradictory demands of performance 
and function, which can be resolved only by externally 
stimulated internal reflection. The interdisciplinary 
key-concept of the organizational interest should be 
oriented exactly towards this dual requirement. The 




























































































process (69), nor the orientation of economic action 
towards the consumer interest (70), nor maximum increase 
in yield , not to speak of profit maximization (71). 
Instead, the organizational interest is directed towards 
the creation of organizational structures for such 
discursive unification processes as to allow the optimal 
attunement of company performance and company function.
How can such dependence on the environment be transposed 
to structures? What contribution can the company 
constitution make to this? As far as the yield function 
of the firm is concerned, this has been brought about in 
three ways in historical development processes. Profit 
taking proceeds juridically through private property and 
company law, taxation through tax laws that have to be 
justified politically, and taking wages, or the securing 
of jobs, through the legally guaranteed conflictual 
system of collective bargaining.
In principle these drawing off interests run along 
separate lines. It is at this point that the central 
reference problem of the company constitution should be 
formulated. It seems to be an essentially still 
unresolved control problem how these three siphoning 
-off mechanisms can be coordinated while retaining their 




























































































mechanisms can be allowed to rise inordinately at the 
expense of the others, then any one of the three 
interests - capital, state, labor - can be excluded from 
being sole possessor of control rights. Is the 
alternative then - as in Ulrich - managerialism or state 
coordination?
At this point one ought not immediately to reply with 
the company constitution , but initially embark on an 
analysis of neo-corporatist phenomena (72). This can 
only be sketched out here. The interpretation of 
neo-corporatism would then lie beyond the definitions of 
Schmitter on the one hand and Winkler on the other (73). 
We are dealing not only with a new form of political 
interest intermediation (Schmitter) nor on the other 
hand with a special form of comprehensive governmental 
economic control (Winkler). Neo-corporatist mediatory 
mechanisms would instead be there in order to coordinate 
with each other the three functional mechanisms of the 
economy - profits, taxes, wages - in their mutual 
independence.
This would ultimately again lead to an orientation 
towards social interests, but now not as ends in 
themselves, but instead as means to the realization of 




























































































syndrome would no doubt have to be looked at as a whole. 
Such attunement processes would take place at least at 
three levels: (1) The macro level of major economic 
policy decisions on incomes policy, tax policy and 
profit policy, negotiated among the summit bodies of the 
economy, the trade unions and government bodies; (2) 
the meso level of regional and sectoral structure policy 
and the relationship between employer associations and 
trade unions; (3) the micro level of the enterprise , 
via co-determination processes and public involvement, 
which would mediate between the systems for distributing 
the firm's yield (company law profit distribution and 
collectively bargained wages). This definition of 
neo-corporatist phenomena would relate in the first 
place to the yield function of the economy in the above 
defined sense. One would have to consider the extent to 
which neo-corporatist structures can continue to be used 
also for the attunement between functional requirements 
on the one hand and performance requirements on the 
other. The company constitution would then be defined 
as the internalization of external social pressures, 
related to the balancing of the various functional 
mechanisms and the performance requirements of the 
enterprise.
At this stage only preliminary institutional conclusions 




























































































to relate the company constitution to the total context 
of neo-corporatist mediatory mechanisms at the various 
levels. Codetermination and company constitution would 
have to be precisely aligned on this, also from the 
legal standpoint. On this view, co-determination law 
would have to be separated from its individualistic or 
interest group related interpretation and reoriented 
towards this kind of social guidance concept. This 
would have consequences that would extend into the 
questions of the position in co-determination law of the 
trade-unions, of information and accountability 
obligations, of the delimitation of co-determination and 
collective bargaining system, and of the institutional 
links of the organizations and their internal 
structures. Secondly, this approach would have 
implications particularly for state participation in 
co-determination models. The public interests that 
would have to be represented in the firm would primarily 
have to be aligned on the yield function and the 
questions of distribution,, and only secondarily on 
attunement with performance requirements of the 
enterprise. In this perspective , Stone's far-reaching 
structural proposals would have to be rethought, as 
would Ulrich's general functional definitions. This 
linkage between function and structure might in the very 
end provide a chance of making the theory of social 
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